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EXPLANATION IN METAPHYSICS AND BOLZANO’S THEORY OF
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Abstract
In (2006a, 2006b), Benjamin Schnieder criticizes truthmaking as
a relation between entities in the world and the truths those entities
‘make true’. In (2006b), his criticism exploits a notion of conceptual
explanation that is very similar to Bolzano’s grounding. In the rst
part of this paper, I offer an analysis of Bolzano’s grounding. I
discuss some open problems and argue that Bolzano’s grounding is
not a systematization of the ordinary notion of ‘because’ as others
have maintained, but of the technical notion of explanatory proof in
the context of an axiomatic conception of (proper) science. On the
basis of this analysis, in the second part, I offer a critical discussion
of Schnieder 2006b’s arguments against truthmaking. I conclude
that the latter are not very effective from a methodological point of
view and that Bolzano’s original position fares better in this respect;
still, truthmaker theorists will be able to defend truthmaking only at
a high price.
1. Truthmaking, explanation, and Bolzano’s grounding
The notion of explanation has received renewed attention in present-day an-
alytic metaphysics. One example is the debate on the notion of truthmaking
as explanatory of truth. Truthmaking is often construed as a form of ground-
ing: in particular, the truth of specic statements is said to be grounded
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282 ARIANNA BETTI
in some entity in the world playing the role of truthmaker for such state-
ments. For instance, the truth of ‘Socrates is pale’ is taken to be grounded
in e.g. Socrates’ paleness, a trope (alternatively, in Socrates’ being pale, a
fact or state of affairs). This construal of truthmaking as grounding, in turn,
has licensed interpretations according to which entities serving as truthmak-
ers provide metaphysical or ontological explanations for the truths they are
truthmakers of (Simon and Smith 20071 ). Why is the statement ‘Socrates is
pale’ true? Because there exists a trope of paleness in Socrates (or: because
the world contains a fact, Socrates’ being pale), which makes that statement
true.
But this is strange, critics say. When asked: why is the statement ‘Socrates
is pale’ true?, one would reply: because Socrates is pale; and if asked, in
turn, why is Socrates pale?, one would say: because he’s scared to death
(cf. Künne 2003: 150). Or one would say: because he’s a white guy with
skin type I. In other words, answers in terms of truthmaking are a bad kind
of explanatory answers to why-questions about truth and predication (and
indeed about anything else)  or so goes, arguably, the critic’s argument.
Causal explanations are good (e.g. ‘Socrates is pale because he’s scared to
death’), conceptual explanations are good (e.g. ‘Socrates is pale because
he’s a white guy with skin type I’), but metaphysical explanations  such as
Socrates is pale’ is true because there exists a trope of paleness in Socrates’
 those are bad.2
The debate above takes place within a quite specic discussion on truth-
making in metaphysics. Although it involves a general notion of explanation,
i.e. both causal and non-causal, the debate hasn’t crossed paths with the vast
literature on explanation in philosophy of science. This is not much of a sur-
prise: due to emphasis on natural sciences, physics in particular, philosophy
of science tends to centre on causal explanation, while the debate mentioned
1 “‘John exists’, ‘Socrates is mortal’, ‘That event is a kissing’. Judgments in this group
are true if and only if the entity to which existence is attributed, or of which something
essential is predicated, does in fact exist. The existence of that entity yields an ontological
explanation of the corresponding truth.” (Simon and Smith 2007, my emphasis). In the case
of standard accidental predications such as ‘John is hungry’, it is the existence of a quality
(or trope) of being hungry (that is, John’s) that provides us with an ontological explanation.
2 This criticism of truthmaking is directed against truthmaking’s being explanatory of
specific truths such as ‘Socrates is pale’ (Schnieder 2006b). In this paper, I will concentrate
on the latter criticism and disregard objections according to which (trope-theoretical) truth-
making cannot give a unified account of what all truths have in common, ergo it can give no
explanation of the concept of truth (Künne 2003: 148).
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above makes appeal to notions of non-causal explanation which philoso-
phy of science tends instead to marginalize (cf. Schnieder 2006b: 389).3
Generally speaking, the terminology and the conceptual apparatus of dis-
cussions of explanation in philosophy of science has little in common with
the terminology and the conceptual apparatus of the debate in metaphysics I
am considering in this paper (see e.g. Salmon’s epistemic, modal and ontic
conceptions of explanations in Salmon 1998: 63). I think this situation is
unfortunate. Before I say more on this, however, I will say something about
how I construe the three kinds of explanation mentioned above throughout
this paper. Causal explanations are those in which an object in the world
in the broadest sense is said to be explained by its cause: ‘p because q’ is
a causal explanation when q describes or states the cause of the effect de-
scribed or stated by p.4 Metaphysical explanations here are truthmaker ex-
planations: ‘p because q’ is a metaphysical explanation when q describes or
states a truth (i.e. a true statement or proposition5 ), and p describes or states
(the existence of) an object in the world that plays the role of truthmaker for
that truth. As to conceptual explanations, there isn’t any particularly helpful
characterisation readily available in the literature; ‘conceptual explanation’
seems to be a rather wide umbrella term for explanations based on concepts
(‘based on concepts’ is how I shall construe ‘conceptual’ throughout the pa-
per). These include all cases of ‘p because q’-statements that are true on
the basis of other tacitly or previously accepted truths, rules or other state-
ments regulating the connection of p and q in view of the concepts involved
in them, and in such a way that p follows from q on that basis (but not vice
versa). Examples par excellence of statements regulating the connection of
concepts are denitions. Another example is natural deduction rules.
3 Forms of non-causal explanation do play an important role in the philosophy of natural
sciences other than physics (e.g. functional explanations in biology). However, the discussion
of those forms of explanation does not relate to the kind of explanations at issue here; besides,
dominant, mainstream trends in philosophy of science tend to favour philosophy of physics.
4 For the sake of this paper, it does not matter what I mean by ‘objects in the world’
here (whether they are (bare) particulars, events, states, tropes, facts or bundles of them) —
and I do not intend to commit myself to any metaphysical view in particular. The contrast
important to me here is that between objects in the world that can enter causal relations as
causes or effects, on the one hand, and items serving as truth-bearers that can refer to objects
in the world, on the other.
5 In view of my treatment of Bolzano and to avoid complications on this point, I will
henceforth take propositions as truthbearers (which Bolzano takes to be abstract, non-
linguistic items serving as meanings of sentences). My ‘concepts’ will be then most easily
construed as constituents of propositions (though one can take them to be the meanings of
terms appearing in sentences in use, or to be just meaningful terms).
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On the basis of the above:
(Causal) Socrates is pale because he’s scared to death
(Metaphysical) ‘Socrates is pale’ is true because there exists a trope of
paleness in Socrates
(Conceptual) Socrates is pale because he’s a white guy with skin type I.
Importantly, although in all three cases above ‘because’ is a two-place predi-
cate connecting two propositions, the relata of the relations that are involved
in these three cases are all different: two objects, an object and a truth, two
truths. (Causal) is true iff there is a causal relation between two objects in
the world: Socrates’ being scared to death and his paleness. (Metaphysical)
is true iff there is a truthmaking relation between an object in the world and
a true proposition: Socrates’ paleness and ‘Socrates is pale’. Finally, (Con-
ceptual) is true iff true proposition q follows from true proposition p on the
basis of at least a third proposition ruling in an appropriate manner the con-
nection of concepts involved in p and q. For example, ‘Socrates is pale’ (a
truth) follows from ‘Socrates is a white guy with skin type I’ (another truth)
because the concept of paleness and that of skin type I are appropriately re-
lated in a third truth, say ‘human skin type I according to Fitzpatrick’s scale
is mostly pale in colour’.
As I said, the debate in metaphysics involving the three notions at issue,
causal and non-causal (i.e. metaphysical and conceptual), does not cross the
debate on explanation in the philosophy of science. I also said that I nd
this unfortunate. The reason is that no matter how pluralistic one wants to
be about explanation, a general account of explanation tout court seems to
be called for. By this I do not mean that we should strive towards a single
model or theory of explanation, be it causal or not; I mean that we should
strive towards a unied, maximally broad discussion of what we (are pre-
pared to correctly) call by one and the same name: ‘explanation’. I see
three important, interconnected reasons for this. First, mathematical expla-
nations are non-causal. Surely mathematics is worth its name as a science
as much as physics is? If so, explanation in mathematics is a legitimate
form of scientic explanation as much as explanation in physics is. What is
their common genus then, what grounds their acceptability as both forms of
explanation? Secondly, mathematical explanations come in two kinds (see
Mancosu 2008). I shall call these two kinds internal and external. Internal
mathematical explanations are explanations within pure mathematics. Ex-
planatory proofs within mathematics (e.g. Why do the four angles of every
quadrangle taken together equal four right angles?), i.e. proofs of mathemat-
ical results which involve only other mathematical results (Because every
quadrangle can be divided in two triangles whose angles taken together are
equal to the angles of the quadrangle, and the three angles of a triangle are
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equal to two right angles) are examples of conceptual explanations in this
sense. Instead, external mathematical explanations are explanations in which
non-mathematical phenomena (e.g. Why do hive-bee honeycombs have a
hexagonal structure?) are partially explained by mathematical ndings (be-
cause any partition of the plane into regions of equal area has perimeter at
least that of the regular hexagonal honeycomb tiling). Thus, external math-
ematical explanations play an important role in giving explanations in the
natural sciences (cf. also Baker 2009). Thirdly, if we excessively restrict
the scope of meaning of the term ‘explanation’ (e.g. to ‘causal explana-
tion’), thus renouncing a unied understanding of the notion, we won’t be
able to rely on very many important historical case studies for scientic ex-
planation, including many cases of external mathematical explanations for
physics (e.g., Newton’s exhibition of the system of the world from mathe-
matical principles). That would hamper our understanding of the past, make
us miss important insights, and would mean a separation of philosophy (of
science) from its history  a perspective that, witness what I have to say in
this paper, I nd disastrous.
Mathematical explanations are conceptual explanations, namely connec-
tions among propositions resting on the properties of some concepts. This
means that explanation in mathematics and conceptual explanation in pres-
ent-day metaphysics do not just cross paths: they are one of a kind. This
paper is an attempt to ground this claim by providing historical evidence
that the notion of conceptual explanation in present-day metaphysics comes
from Bernard Bolzano’s notion of grounding, which was elaborated in order
to capture a general notion of scientic explanation or explanatory demon-
stration, of which mathematical explanations were a paradigmatic exam-
ple. It is indeed Bolzano’s idea of grounding that prompted and heavily in-
spired the debate in conceptual explanation in analytic metaphysics I recalled
above, although this rarely emerges from the literature as clearly as it should
 which is a pity, since Bolzano was an extraordinary philosopher-cum-
mathematician who deserves to be better known. The debts to Bolzano’s
ideas on explanation are also clear (and better stated) in the literature in
philosophy of mathematics, in Kitcher 1975, Detlefsen 1988 and Mancosu
1999, who calls Bolzano’s theory of grounding the rst fully developed at-
tempt to provide an account of mathematical explanation (Mancosu 1999:
430).
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 1, I present an analysis of
Bolzano’s views on explanation, i.e. his theory of ground and consequence.
In Section 2, on the basis of this analysis, I argue that the aim of Bolza-
nian grounding is not to capture the ordinary meaning of ‘because’ in ev-
eryday language. In Sections 3 and 4, I defend my position against possi-
ble objections. This is important, for it is crucial to my purposes to show
that Bolzano’s grounding had explicit scientic aims. These sections are a
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scholarly contribution to Bolzano research and research on history of logic
and axiomatics, especially the history of (logical) consequence: I argue that
Bolzano wished to reduce grounding to a form of derivability, though he
could not, because of obstacles largely technical in nature. In Section 5, I
will discuss and evaluate the use made of Bolzano’s ideas in the debate on
truthmaking as metaphysical explanation.
2. Bolzano on explanation
Of the three kinds of explanation we saw above, Bolzano accepts in fact
only one: conceptual explanation. Bolzano’s views on conceptual explana-
tion in his main work, the monumental Wissenschaftslehre (Bolzano 1837,
henceforth: WL), come down to his views on grounding (Abfolge), a con-
cept whose importance for Bolzano’s philosophy is hard to overestimate.6
Grounding is a relation holding among propositions, not facts, events, sub-
stances, or anything else we might take propositions to be about in the most
basic and straightforward cases. Only propositions can be grounds (Gründe)
and consequences (Folgen). In this respect grounding is similar to deriv-
ability (Ableitbarkeit), which corresponds nearly to our notion of (logical)
consequence. Very roughly, a proposition p is derivable from q for Bolzano
iff whenever q is true, then p is also true (for ‘whenever’ read ‘if, for some
admissible variations of some parts of q,’). Although both grounding and
derivability can be said to capture the idea of a proposition(s) (objectively)
following from (an)other proposition(s), they differ in four respects: ground-
ing is a relation which is irreexive, intransitive, asymmetric, and holds only
between true propositions; none of this holds for derivability: derivability
holds also among false propositions and is reexive, transitive, and not asym-
metric (and neither it is symmetric, nor antisymmetric, i.e. in some cases,
p is derivable from q and vice versa; in these cases, p and q are said to be
equivalent).7 Consider:
(i) Well-functioning thermometers are higher in summer than in winter (p)
because it is warmer in summer than in winter (q) (cf. WL§162, I 192)
6 In Bolzano 1851/1975: 39, the notion of grounding is listed as being as important as
those of derivability, concept, and intuition.
7 For a reconstruction of grounding and for the difference between grounding, derivabil-
ity, causality and epistemic reason, a relation between judgments, see Tatzel 2002. For an
introduction to Bolzano’s logic, philosophy and the basic notions of his work, see Morscher
2008, Sebestik
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(i) is true, but its converse is not: it is not because well-functioning ther-
mometers are higher in summer than in winter (q) that it is warmer in sum-
mer than in winter (p); it is q to ground p, like (i) says, not the other way
around. However, propositions p and q are inter-derivable, i.e. equivalent.8
The same holds for
(ii) Every pair of circles, one described around the centre a, the other
around b, both with radius ab and lying in one and the same plane
containing these points must intersect (p) because for every two points
a and b there must be a third c such that ca = cb = ab (q) (cf. Bolzano
18331841, §13).
The most striking difference between grounding and derivability is perhaps
intransitivity. By ‘grounding’, Bolzano means immediate and complete
grounding so grounding is, so to speak, strictly and merely dyadic and it
is unique: there cannot be more than a single consequence for each ground
and vice versa, there is only a single ground for each single consequence
(WL§206). So, the consequence of a consequence is no consequence of a
ground. But ground and consequence can be collections of propositions; in-
deed, consequences are always collections of propositions because among
the consequences of a proposition p there is always the proposition: p is
true. Truths which are parts of the collections making up the ground and the
consequence in a grounding relation are called ‘partial grounds’ and ‘partial
consequences’. In the terms in which I put conceptual grounding, the con-
nection of concepts in p and q is regulated by a third truth; on the basis of
what we have seen thus far, the third truth will have to be part of the complete
ground of p (in some cases it will be identical with it).
Why does Bolzano need grounding in addition to derivability and why is
grounding such an important notion for him? This is an interesting question
that is hardly dealt with satisfactorily in the literature. Both elements are
due to his general conception of science, in any case his ideal of a priori (or
conceptual, as I shall say, following Bolzano) sciences such as mathematics.
Let’s consider this in some detail.
In his pious life, Bolzano took up two enormous enterprises: the creation
of a new logic that had to be adequate for the foundation of mathematics and
the systematic treatment of all branches of mathematics according to this
new logic. The rst attempt is published in the Wissenschaftslehre (‘Theory
8 Note that Bolzano’s Ableitbarkeit is not constrained as to which parts of the propo-
sitions involved should be varied. In this example, the parts involved in the variation are
the parts corresponding to ‘summer’ and ‘winter’ (the general form being: ‘well-functioning
thermometers are higher in x than in y, because it is warmer in x than in y’).
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of Science’, that is, his Logic, 1837) the second is contained in the unpub-
lished Größenlehre (‘Theory of Magnitudes’, that is, his Mathematics). How
should we understand ‘systematic treatment of all branches of mathemat-
ics’? Via grounding: a systematic treatment of mathematics is an ordering
of its truths (i.e. true propositions) as a chain of grounds and consequences
which is objective, i.e. it is an ordering of mathematical truths as they are
in themselves (and not to the extent we know them or get to know them).
The task of developing the theory of grounding in all generality belongs to
logic. In other words, logic fulls the methodologically foundational task
of a theory of science by affording the proper scientic method and it does
this by developing a theory of grounding (Bolzano 18331841, §17; WL§1).
This foundational task of logic, however, is by no means only geared to-
wards the proper systematization of mathematics. It might seem otherwise
because Bolzano calls the method ‘mathematical’ (see Bolzano 18331841).
But the method is called ‘mathematical’ not because it should be applied to
mathematics only. Indeed, Bolzano gives examples of grounding in quite
different elds of knowledge, including ethics (WL§200, II 348, 4.; Bolzano
18331841, §14). The reason the method is called ‘mathematical’ is because
mathematics is the paradigmatic science that can be built according to it, that
is, mathematics is a proper science (Bolzano 1810: II, §1).
What exactly is a proper science according to Bolzano? Again, we don’t
know all the details. But here’s a rough answer to this. Bolzano was a fol-
lower of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science, the ideal which, for exam-
ple, inspires Euclid’s Elements.9 A reconstruction of this ideal in seven re-
quirements is captured in de Jong and Betti 2010’s Classical Model (or Ideal)
of Science. According to the latter, traditionally a science S is a proper or
real science when:
(1) All propositions and all concepts of S concern a specic set of objects
or are about a certain domain of being(s).
(2a) There are in S a number of so-called fundamental concepts.
(2b) All other concepts occurring in S are composed of (or are denable
from) these fundamental concepts.
(3a) There are in S a number of so-called fundamental propositions.
(3b) All other propositions of S follow from or are grounded in (or are
provable or demonstrable from) these fundamental propositions.
(4) All propositions of S are true.
(5) All propositions of S are universal and necessary in some sense or
another.
9 For more on this, see de Jong 2001.
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(6) All propositions of S are known to be true. A non-fundamental propo-
sition is known to be true through its proof in S.
(7) All concepts or terms of S are adequately known. A non-fundamental
concept is adequately known through its composition (or denition).
Bolzano championed this model both as a philosopher and in his practice as
a mathematician.10 Put in terms of the ideal captured in (17), what Bolzano
criticized again and again in mathematicians11 was not their general adher-
ence to it, for that adherence was widespread. Bolzano’s criticism regarded
the realization of that ideal as an ideal of explanation in mathematical prac-
tice. First and foremost, he criticized deviation from this ideal in strictly sci-
entific expositions of mathematics. To be more specic, Bolzano advocated
a strong construal of (3b) as grounding in the edication of science, and held
rigorously and consistently to it, so that a proper science would full (3b)
just in case its fundamental propositions related to all other propositions as
grounds to consequences (Bolzano 1810: II §2). A strictly scientic expo-
sition is one that matches this structure: it orders the truths of a science in a
ground-consequence structure.
The major methodological objections Bolzano expresses towards his fel-
low mathematicians can be interpreted as linked to this point. Traditional
expositions of mathematics, he laments, reverse the order of proofs, which
means that they do not seek to give real proofs, proofs proceeding from
grounds to consequences (Begründungen), but at most certifications (Gewiß-
machungen, WL§525, 261).12 To put it in Aristotelian terms, what Bolzano
was after were not demonstrations ‘of the fact’ (Öτι) but demonstrations of
the ‘reasoned fact’ (διότι):
At one time something might have seemed superuous, as when
Thales [...] took much trouble to prove that the angles at the base of
an isosceles triangle are equal, for this is obvious to common sense.
But Thales did not doubt that it was so, he only wanted to know why
the mind makes this necessary judgement. And notice, by drawing
out the elements of a hidden argument and making us clearly aware
10 Given his strong notion of knowledge (Wissen), however, it seems that Bolzano cannot
be simply said to adhere to (6) without further ado. See on this Konzelmann Ziv 2009.
11 One of Bolzano’s targets was Kästner 1758, a big compendium that went through six
editions in 1758–1800 (Johnson 1977: 265).
12 Cf. the (late) Anti-Euklid, see Mancosu 1999: 436–7; Bolzano 1833–1841, §14,
Anm. 1.
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of them, he thereby obtained the key to new truths which were not
so clear to common sense. (Bolzano 1804: Preface).13
Bolzano implemented the construal of (3b) as grounding in his practice as
a mathematician.14 He also insisted, following the Classical Ideal, that one
should give precise denitions (2b), limited to the specic domain of a sci-
ence (1). One might think at rst that such a traditional take on science
could not be of help to Bolzano’s creativity,15 but it was in fact Bolzano’s
insistence on this ideal  starting from the Betrachtungen (1804)  and on
the dull essentialist problem of denitions to lead Bolzano to break from
the bonds of traditional geometry and to explore, or shall we say ‘invent’,
the unknown domain of topology. (Johnson 1977: 263).
According to Bolzano, proper sciences are grounding chains of (collec-
tions of) truths ((4) above; cf. Bolzano 18331841, §14, Anm. 1). Among
those truths are fundamental truths (axioms, see 3a), the chain’s starting
points: these have consequences which they ground, but they have no ground
themselves (at least not in that very science; more on this later). Bolzano’s
enterprise can be described as the search for the adequate construal and ap-
plication of the requirement that in a proper science the relation among truths
constituting that science is grounding, not derivability. And the reason why
derivability is not enough, then, is this. Giving a scientic account means
providing explanations, that is, establishing a grounding order, settling what
grounds what. Properly scientic proofs are thus only those proofs where
true premises are also grounds of their (true) conclusions.16 These are known
as explanatory proofs (Mancosu 1999).17 Derivability, as such, is way too
weak to provide such proofs. As we will see in Section 4, however, I do
think that Bolzano genuinely endeavoured to nd a constrained notion of
derivability strong enough to give him grounding.
13 See also Bolzano 1810: II §2. On ‘fact’ vs. ‘reasoned fact’, see also the note to
WL§198, Bolzano 1833–1841, §14 and Mancosu 2008, Section 2.
14 Cf. Bolzano 1817: 4–6. See also Rusnock 2000: 70 and ff.
15 For example Waldegg 2001 observes that the Classical Ideal of Science functioned as
a Bachelardian ‘epistemic obstacle’ responsible for Bolzano’s conservative attitude towards
Euclidean geometry.
16 Cf. Sebestik 1992: 271. To be precise, since ‘ground’ is often a collection of proposi-
tions, true premises in a specific proof will often be partial grounds, i.e. part of the ground of
their consequences.
17 Elements of Dubucs and Lapointe 2006 seems to imply an alternative interpretation —
for reasons of space I will not discuss here whether and how this is the case.
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The previous makes us understand one thing: Bolzano’s aim in developing
his theory of grounding was not to capture our ordinary notion of ‘because’,
but to systematize the technical notion of explanatory proof in the context of
an axiomatic conception of (proper) science.
3. Bolzano’s grounding is not a theory of the ordinary concept expressed by
‘because’
The claim I have just made opposes an aspect of Tatzel 2002’s analysis of
Bolzano’s intents. Tatzel criticizes Bolzano’s construal of grounding as an
intransitive relation apparently on the basis of the assumption that Bolzano’s
theory aimed at capturing the concept at stake in our ordinary use of ‘be-
cause’:
Bolzano [...] restricts himself to a very narrow, technical use [...]
he uses ‘ground’ and ‘consequence’ for immediate and complete
grounds and consequences. [...] I do not agree with Bolzano here. I
think that a less strict concept that also captures mediate and partial
grounds ts much better with our ordinary use of ‘because’ (Tatzel
2002: 7).18
We use ‘because’ to express a transitive concept in natural language; ergo,
Bolzano’s theory of grounding does not achieve its aims. Let us agree for
the sake of the argument that ‘because’ expresses a transitive concept in
natural language. This granted: I agree that if Bolzano’s goal had been
that of explicating the meaning of ‘because’ in everyday language, then he
should have characterised grounding as a transitive relation. The fact is that
he doesn’t. So, either Bolzano is wrong or we are: either there is something
wrong in what Bolzano has to offer us as an explication of the ordinary
concept expressed by ‘because’ or we are wrong in thinking that his goal is
18 Indeed, Tatzel defines a notion of mediate grounding in his paper and proposes to use
this notion to capture the ordinary concept. Note that the reconstruction of Bolzano’s the-
ory of grounding in Tatzel’s paper is an excellent piece of work, one from which I profited
much. If I insist on the differences between Tatzel’s interpretation-cum-evaluation and mine
is exactly because his reconstruction is exemplary — a truly helpful and rich one.
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offering us an explication of the ordinary concept expressed by ‘because’.19
I think the latter is the case.
I think that, given Bolzano’s aims, it was a sensible thing for him to want
the relation of ground and consequence to be intransitive. In this section I
shall explain why I think so. Bolzano’s goal was to make a proper scientic
explanation or proof unique,20 i.e. for every consequence of a science (a
collection of theorems), there’s one and only one ground for it (an axiom, or
a collection of truths including axioms). And, in turn he needed the latter, I
maintain, to give an answer to this age-old problem: what makes an axiom
an axiom? I shall discuss the point via an analysis of two possible problems
of my stance, i.e. that Bolzano’s aim was to systematize the technical notion
of explanatory proof in the context of an axiomatic conception of science
and not to capture our ordinary ‘because’.
One might argue that I’m wrong in view of the fact that Bolzano often
discusses the ordinary use of terms, and especially on the basis of para-
graphs such as §177, where Bolzano discusses propositions of the form ‘A
is, because B is’. What Bolzano says in such passages, however, does not
show that his technical terms are explications of the use of ordinary life
(WL§20). Even less is §177 evidence that the theoretical goal of Bolzano’s
theory of grounding is that of capturing the ordinary meaning of ‘because’.
Bolzano says there that ‘A is, because B is’ is the linguistic expression
through which we express the relation of grounding:
We say: A is because B is, if we want to say that the ground  the
complete or a partial ground of truth A  lies in truth B (§177).
What is going on here? I think the following is going on. First of all, Bolzano
normatively establishes his technical notion of grounding: in §162 he xes
‘grounding’ as an intransitive relation and ‘ground’ as ‘complete ground’.
Then (§177) he looks descriptively at how linguistic expressions of the form
‘p because q’ fare in this respect and he nds out that they express, in terms
of the notion of grounding he has xed, either complete or partial grounding.
But Bolzanian grounding is not either complete or partial: it is complete. So
19 An anonymous referee has pointed out that my interpretation and Tatzel’s interpretation
are not incompatible since Bolzano might have two goals. But the two goals are incompatible,
for the same relation cannot be both transitive and intransitive. One can accept both kinds of
relations, of course, but then they cannot both be primitive. Bolzano’s primitive grounding is
intransitive. So, we should seek an interpretation which first of all does justice to this. My
interpretation attempts to do that, Tatzel’s does not: he gives no grounds why Bolzano should
at all want to have intransitive grounding.
20 Cf. WL§528, 266; Sebestik 1992: 260; 276.
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I do not see how §177 can count as evidence for the claim that Bolzano’s
grounding aims at capturing ‘the everyday concept’ expressed by ‘because’.
As was said, this concept is at most that of partial grounding. If Bolzano
wanted to capture that, his (primitive notion of) grounding would be partial
grounding, but it is not. It should be clear that I am not denying that Bolzano
does engage in discussions about linguistic use, for he obviously does. In
fact, it would be strange if he didn’t: given Bolzano’s emphasis on writing
scientic treatises and his attention on how to communicate scientic nd-
ings in an apt way, rhetorics and semiotics are important to him. What I deny
is that Bolzano’s methodology is that of looking at how people21 use words
such as ‘because’ to collect normative evidence for philosophy, i.e. evidence
on the basis of which to decide what the concept of grounding is. Bolzano
is not an ordinary language philosopher.22 His approach seems to be rather
the opposite: if ordinary language conforms to what is useful and sensible
to scientic aims, good. If not, well, this is a problem for and with ordinary
language  and something writers of science should be keenly aware of. A
passage from §280 seems emblematic of Bolzano’s attitude:
A distinction among our representations which is so remarkable that
we nd ourselves induced to speak about it frequently even in ordi-
nary life is the distinction thanks to which we usually divide them
into clear and obscure. Yet in ordinary life one would hardly as-
sociate the same concepts with these expressions all the time, and
we are, therefore, not only allowed but even obliged to specify their
21 It is not even clear how we should interpret ‘people’ here. All German-speaking
Czechs? All Czechs? Writers of newspaper articles? Sometimes Bolzano seems to take
‘common use’ to be the use of his colleague scientists, philosophers, or mathematicians in
their writings; cf. WL§39, where ‘Menschen’ equals ‘the readers of the Theory of Science’.
22 Tatzel seems to assume this much when he says: “His reason [Bolzano’s, A.B.] is that
he thinks that what I call ‘mediate grounds (consequences)’ are not really grounds (conse-
quences) in the proper sense of that word (cf. §§213, 217). I don’t think that Bolzano is right
in thinking so, as long as our understanding of ‘ground’ and ‘consequence’ is derived from
our ordinary use of ‘because’.” [...] “I therefore conclude that if Bolzano’s basic assump-
tion, that ‘because’, in its ordinary language use, brings into play a relation between truths,
is true at all, then the concept of mediate grounding is the best candidate for its meaning.”
(my emphasis). Tatzel also writes: “There are different possibilities for fixing a concept that
prima facie corresponds to the intuitions Bolzano is alluding to.” (Tatzel 2002: 7). As I am
trying to show, Bolzano is not ‘alluding to intuitions’ about the ordinary concept expressed
by ‘because’, he has scientific explanation in mind, and, paradigmatically, mathematical ex-
planatory proofs.
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meaning here in the way which is most useful to the purposes of
science. (WL§280, III 25).23
So, in case of conict between common use and scientic aims, Bolzano
thinks it is obligatory to deviate from common use. When he discusses the
ordinary use of some terms, Bolzano’s aim is often to sweep away the ir-
relevant, dangerous secondary presentations (Nebenvorstellungen, Bolzano
18331841: §9, 2. Anm. 1) that might be awoken in readers, or, in case of
primitive technical notions, to introduce them by ‘descriptions’ (Verständi-
gungen)  a technique which he explicitly set out to master as part of a
traditional concern on epistemic access to sciences as exposed in textbooks
(cf. Bolzano 18331841: §9ff.). Again, there might be many such expo-
sitions: rigorously scientific will be only those which match the objective
order of grounds and consequences.
Another possible weakness of my stance is the following.
4. Bolzano’s Problem: Is Grounding reducible to Derivability?
If I am right, how come that, rst, in the Wissenschaftslehre grounding is a
primitive concept and, second, that Bolzano gives us so little of his supposed
theory of grounding that to speak of a ‘theory’ is almost preposterous? If the
interpretation I have sketched in the previous section is correct, the fact that
Bolzano gives so little of a theory is puzzling, for much seems to depend on
the existence of that theory as such. If it does not exist, my interpretation
becomes a lot less attractive.
To this I’d say that it is one thing to adhere to some scientic ideal and to
set out to realize it. It is another thing to brilliantly succeed on all fronts. It’s
uncertainty with the latter thing that bothered Bolzano. Here’s how I think
things stand. In some parts of the Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano does indeed
treat grounding as primitive. He notes that he has not managed to nd a
denition of grounding, this being due either to failure on his side (due to
his subjective ‘ignorance’) or because the concept is really primitive, that
is, simple (the task is objectively ‘impossible’). But Bolzano is genuinely
unsure whether grounding is a primitive or can be dened. Note that Bolza-
nian denitions rely on a compositional theory of concepts: a denition of a
concept must reveal the (simpler) parts of which the concept is composed:
23 Cf. also WL§35 (I, 161): “For if we take the word presentation in its proper meaning,
necessary for the purpose of science...”.
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[By] denitions (Erklärungen) [...] I understand here nothing other
than propositions which specify whether a certain representation
[...] is simple or composed of parts, and in the latter case, of what
parts it consists and in what connection. (WL§554, IV 3301; see
also §§3501, III 397405; §§5559, IV 332350; Bolzano 1833
1841: §9.1).
This means that wondering whether grounding is a primitive notion means
wondering whether it is a simple concept, i.e. a concept that has no parts.
The crux is the question whether grounding can be dened as a kind of deriv-
ability.24 Bolzano says that it seems probable that grounding is a kind of
derivability (§200, 347) but can’t give a proof (§200, 349) and gives an argu-
ment why he can’t give a proof (§200, 3489). But twenty paragraphs later
Bolzano gives a tentative denition of grounding on the basis of derivability:
(*) that order among truths in virtue of which from the smallest
amount of simple premises the biggest amount of the remaining
truths can be derived [ableiten lassen] as mere conclusions (§221).
It is unclear why Bolzano is dissatised with this denition. For us, it is
quite interesting.
First, the denition tells us that Bolzano reduces explanatory power (of a
collection of propositions) to other theoretical values: simplicity and (ock-
hamian) economy (mind that collections of propositions are at issue here,
not the objects they are about). It is perhaps worth mentioning in this con-
nection that just before writing down (*) Bolzano clearly points out that a
third theoretical value is involved: generality. However, there is no mention
of generality in (*).25 It is worth dwelling a little longer on the key concepts
of simplicity and generality, both relating to (extensional) qualities of con-
cepts. Simplicity is a mereological notion: a simple object is an object that
does not have parts, and this holds for concepts as well: a simple concept
is a concept that has no parts. Simplicity relates to the content of concepts
(Inhalt), i.e. the mereological sum of their parts. Generality relates instead
to the extension of concepts (Umfang), i.e. the objects falling under them: a
24 The notion relevant here seems the notion of exact derivability, cf. Rusnock 2000:
149–153.
25 Indeed, in a strictly scientific ordering, simplicity overrules generality: “The simpler
truth must be stated in advance of the more complex and, here there is equal complexity, the
more general must always be stated before the more particular.” Bolzano 1833–1841: 17
(69v), cf. also Sebestik 1992: 275. For the simplicity requirement for axioms in the early
Bolzano, cf. Sebestik 1992: 276.
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concept is more general the greater the cardinality of its extension (questions
of different mathematical innities aside). I said above that Bolzano criti-
cized expositions of mathematics in his predecessors for reversing grounds
and consequences; now we know that this is the case when more complex
truths are put before less complex ones and less general truths precede more
general ones. A grounding chain is thus a chain whose complexity grows
the greater the distance from its origins, at the same time as its generality di-
minishes. (Waldegg 2001). This idea can be found everywhere in Bolzano’s
writings, starting from his early mathematical works.26 Note that Bolzano
reduces causal explanations to relations of grounding. I will come back to
causality later.
Secondly, denition (*) fulls the desiderata, for only truths are involved;
asymmetry and irreexivity are secured by a (degree of) simplicity con-
straint; in turn, the latter is reduced to proper parthood since Bolzano’s the-
ory of concepts, as we saw, is compositional; intransitivity is granted by the
two-fold partition of a collection of truths making up a science in such a way
that axioms (The Ground) ground their theorems (The Consequence), and
there is nothing left for theorems to ground (except ‘unsubstantial’ propo-
sitions of the form ‘theorem p is true’). Now recall the axiomatic context I
mentioned in the previous section. Read from that perspective, the quote en-
ables us to dene axioms straightforwardly as just those simple truths from
which, taken together, the highest number of other truths are derivable. (The
concepts italicized here are dened in the previous parts of the Wissenschaft-
slehre.)
Both points above combine well with the circumstance that Bolzanian ax-
ioms do not have any mysterious property of evidence that makes them ax-
ioms:
[I]t will easily be seen that [evidence, ab] is very little suited for pro-
viding a rm basis for the classication of all truths into two classes,
that is, into axioms and theorems. (Bolzano 1810, B §10).27
We can now say why it makes sense for Bolzano to have intransitive ground-
ing: it makes sense because all and only proper grounds of a science are
in fact axioms, and the consequences are the theorems (in specic proofs
the ground might contain other truths  Hilfswahrheiten  next to theo-
rems). So, the way in which Bolzano considers the axioms of a science,
26 See Part II of Bolzano 1804 and Bolzano 1817: 4–6 (Vorrede). Cf. also Folta 1981: 25.
Bolzano’s graphic representations for proofs are ‘grounding trees’, cf. WL§220, Tatzel 2001.
27 Cf. also the first rule in the Vorrede of Bolzano 1804 (Folta 1981: 19).
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its grounds, is, mutatis mutandis, the way in which Bolzano’s posterity will
look at an axiom system for a particular theory, say a system such as Frege’s
Grundgesetze, Russell & Whitehead’s Principia or Le·sniewski’s systems of
Protothetics, Ontology and Mereology.28 On the one hand, we have the ax-
ioms; on the other hand, everything following. The major difference with
later system-builders of axiomatic a priori deductive sciences like Frege
and Le·sniewski is Bolzano’s conviction that grounding had to be unique
(Bolzano 18331841: §14); this excludes alternative axiom systems. I shall
come back to this at the end of the paper.
To sum up: although Bolzano does not take up the tentative denition of
grounding at §221 as the correct one, that denition makes perfect sense
in light of his ideal of science and of his system. It remains to be shown
where his doubts come from (given that, as I maintain, Bolzano’s aim is not
capturing the ordinary use of ‘because’). It should be kept in mind at any
case that the whole issue has deep ramications, and is far too big for this
paper. I will thus limit myself to some preliminary remarks as to what I think
a deeper analysis should turn to.
Sebestik points out that derivability is a formal relation, while ground-
ing is a material one: it depends on the particular character of the ideas
involved (Sebestik 1992: 266; WL§200). Let’s see this: Bolzano distin-
guishes between material and formal grounding. The second notion, formal
grounding, is grounding between propositions which are also derivable and
it is dened as a special kind of derivability on the basis of the rst notion,
(undened) material grounding (§162, 193; §168, 207). The best way to put
the problem, then, seems this:
(Bolzano’s problem) Is material grounding reducible to formal grounding?
Or, to be more precise, is grounding  grounding tout court  denable
as a special kind of derivability? The problem is, again, largely internal to
Bolzano’s system and his view of axiomatic science. Before I try to say
more on this  more than what has already been said in the literature 
one thing needs clarication. I said denition (*) enables us to say what
axioms are, but I did not say whether ‘axioms’ here should be understood
as Bolzano’s Grundsätze or as Bolzano’s Grundwahrheiten. The former are
specic axioms of a science (§420) and are indemonstrable only with re-
spect to that science, but not absolutely indemonstrable; the latter instead
are common, absolutely indemonstrable axioms (§214; §486). This means,
28 Mancosu 1999: 436 finds this unsatisfactory, but I am unsure exactly why. It would
be unsatisfactory, I take, if Bolzano wanted, like some before him, axioms to possess some
intrinsic, ontological or epistemologically constrained qualities next to simplicity and gener-
ality, such as, as I mentioned, evidence.
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as we saw, that Grundwahrheiten are absolutely simple (i.e. composed of
absolutely simple concepts, §350, III 402), while Grundsätze are relatively
simple: their ground could lay in a simpler truth of a more general science.
If we take Bolzano literally, the simple truths in (*) are Grundwahrheiten.
Back to Bolzano’s problem. According to Sebestik 1992: 2656  so to
speak: I am adjusting things to my reformulation  the roots of Bolzano’s
problem are causality and an issue raised in the argument in WL§200. Let’s
see the latter rst. In WL§200 Bolzano argues that the answer to the problem
is no by means of a surprising counterexample. Take a practical truth of the
form
(p) One ought to do A
which formally grounds all other practical truths such as ‘One ought not
to lie’.29 This means that the consequence of (p) contains all the practical
truths. Now, if A were impossible, there could be no duty to do A. But this
means that (p) has a (partial) ground in the theoretical truth
(s) A is possible.
So, the complete ground of (p) includes (s). Call this complete ground (s+).
Now, we have no inference rule (Schlussregel), Bolzano argues, which al-
lows us to infer (p) from (s+). (Note that for Bolzano all inference rules
in logic should be based on (logical) derivability, cf. §223, §260.1, Berg
GA 12/3 1988: 10). Why is that? Because none of the truths in (s+) can
contain the concept of Sollen. If any of them did, it would be a practical
truth; however, this is impossible, because we have supposed that all prac-
tical truths are included in the consequence of (p). We have thus found a
case of grounding between underivable (collections of) propositions (s+ and
p). The upshot is: since we cannot derive any proposition containing some
concept (in this case, Sollen) from a collection of proposition not contain-
ing it (in this case, s+), then material grounding is not reducible to formal
grounding. This means that (*) cannot hold: grounding cannot be dened as
a special kind of derivability.
Bolzano’s argument is not particularly easy to follow, and more research is
needed to get a good picture of what exactly is going on in this passage, but
I suspect two assumptions are at work here. The rst rests on the availabil-
ity of appropriate denitions of concepts involved in derivations such as this
one. The appropriate denition of Sollen, a concept contained in (p) cannot
be obtained from the concepts contained in the ground of (p), namely (s+);
this means that (s+) and (p), we can say, are logically unrelated. Recall our
characterisation of conceptual explanation in the introduction: some third
29 An example of a (p)-formed truth is Bolzano’s ‘highest moral law’: Always choose
from all actions that are possible for you the one which, all consequences considered, most
advances the welfare of the whole, in whatever parts (RW I, 236; cf. §447, WL IV 119), cf.
Morscher 2008, 6.2.
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truth must be available which connects the concepts involved in the propo-
sitions standing in a grounding relation. In this case, the truth at issue is,
arguably, something like ‘There cannot be a duty to do A unless A is pos-
sible’. Now suppose that the third truth at issue were instead of the form
‘There is a duty to do A iff A is possible and...’, where the right-hand side
is a conjunction of all and only the theoretical propositions giving necessary
and jointly sufcient conditions for there being a duty to do A (one of which
is ‘A is possible’). This would amount to giving a denition of Sollen on the
basis of possible or similar theoretical concepts: would (p), in this case, be
formally grounded in (s+)? Arguably, yes, or at least, on the basis of Bolzano
18331841: §17, I think that Bolzano would say this. This denition cannot
be given; it cannot be put into (s+), the ground of (p), so, grounding is not as
a special kind of derivability.30
Suppose that we now understand the argument. Well, it is still surpris-
ing. For isn’t Bolzano asking too much of grounding? Note rst of all that
(p) above is in fact a(n) (specic) axiom of a science, ethics, from which
all consequences of that science are derivable, and which contains a concept
primitive in ethics, Sollen. Now, why on earth would one require, in order for
grounding to be dened as a special kind of derivability, that a concept which
is primitive in a practical science, Sollen, be denable from the concepts of
another science, a theoretical one? This is where the second assumption
comes in. Recall the difference I mentioned above between internal and
external explanation. Let’s say that ‘internal conceptual explanations’ are
explanatory relations among explanandum p and explanans q resting on con-
nections of concepts belonging exclusively to a certain science S; ‘external
conceptual explanations’ are explanatory relations among p and q where p
and q are such that the concepts involved in p belong to S, whereas at least
some of the concepts of q belong to a second science S ′, and the third truth
at issue connects concepts belonging both to S and S ′. What seems to me
clear from the argument (and gone unnoticed so far) is that Bolzano does not
distinguish between internal and external explanation and thinks of ground-
ing as subsuming both. (Note that the picture just sketched is consistent with
30 An alternative reading of the argument is possible, according to which the availability of
a definition of Sollen in purely theoretical terms does not solve the difficulty Bolzano points
at. The truth which is the definition of Sollen, one can argue, cannot be a partial ground of (p)
(so it is not contained in (s+)) because the definition still contains Sollen in the definiendum;
and since all propositions containing this notion are partial consequences of p, the definition
cannot be contained in the ground of (p), i.e. (s+): ergo, no formal grounding of (p) from (s+)
is possible. Which reading is correct depends on the role and the significance that Bolzano
assigns to definitions in a grounding structure, and I must leave this very interesting issue
open for further research. Whichever reading is correct, however, Bolzano seems still to
ask too much of grounding and the problem I discuss below in connection with the second
assumption remains.
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taking the notion of axioms denable from (*) to be Grundwahrheiten.) This
I see for now as a hypothesis, though one with enormous implications if true
 one which explains Bolzano’s difculties quite well. A major implication
is that, arguably, Bolzano accepts a humongous grounding chain common
to all sciences, with Grundwahrheiten (common axioms) at the beginning.
Recall now the Classical Ideal of Science with its (17) requirements in-
troduced in Section 1: put in terms of (17), not only are there many sci-
ences, all constructed according to (17), each with their own grounding
chain of Grundsätze (specic axioms) and theorems  say, different inter-
nal grounding chains; there is also an external grounding chain of common
Grundwahrheiten grounding the more and more specic Grundsätze of the
different sciences. (p) is an example of Grundsatz: for grounding to be for-
mal grounding, that Grundsatz should be derivable from some other, simpler,
more general Grundsätze (possibly identical with Grundwahrheiten). But
how is that possible? If this is what Bolzano wanted grounding to accom-
plish, then the whole idea is doomed. No wonder it is extremely difcult
to nd examples of Grundwahrheiten. The reason why the whole idea is
doomed is that for Bolzano whether a proposition grounds another depends
on the unique denability/decomposability of the (more complex) concept-
parts contained in the consequence in terms of the (simpler) concept-parts
contained in the ground.31 While it is in principle possible to have the idea
work for internal grounding, it is impossible to have it work for external
grounding, simply because, like in the example, a Grundsatz of a science S
will contain at least one concept which is undefinable in a (more general)
science S ′: S would presuppose, use the concepts of S ′, whereas in S ′ at
least one new primitive concept will appear that could not be defined in S ′.32
The ‘third truths’ of external conceptual explanations cannot be denitions;
they must be something else.
31 Bolzano believes that there are simple concepts, but when it comes to saying which
concepts are simple, he is cautious: he often says things like ‘probably’ simple are concepts
such as [something], [has], [existence]; indeed, [Something has existence] is a (rare example
of) Grundwahrheit (§214).
32 I cannot add much here, but note that this can be seen clearly by looking at the further
development of the notion of grounding in the history of logic: it got split in two. For in-
stance, one can compare Bolzano’s internal grounding with deducibility within an axiomatic
Les´niewskian system and Bolzano’s external grounding with Les´niewski’s idea of presup-
position among axiomatic systems, and see that what Bolzano wanted to achieve must be
achieved in another way, and that the two notions must be kept separate. The details of this
comparison, including the relationship with the Aristotelian prohibition on kind crossing still
awaits elaboration; this is, again, not the place to do this. On Les´niewski see Betti 2009, Betti
2010.
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I’d cautiously want to conclude from the above that, barring the problem
just sketched with external grounding, (*) is Bolzano’s genuine denition of
(internal) grounding.
Wait. What about causality? Here I will limit myself to a remark. As I
mentioned, Bolzano reduces it to grounding. This seems an obvious obstacle
to Bolzano’s project since causality cannot be construed logically (Sebestik
1992: 265). But causality does not seem a problem from Bolzano’s point
of view. For Bolzano A causes B iff the proposition: A exists, grounds the
proposition: B exists. (Here A is a force or a quality of a (collection of)
substances, or collections of forces or qualities, and existing objects are real
spatio-temporal things being either causes or effects). So, like it or not, for
Bolzano the sentence: ‘God is the cause of the world’ in fact expresses a
relation of grounding between the truth that God exists and the truth that the
world exists (§198). These two propositions can occupy a place in a ground-
ing chain belonging to a science (theology) to the extent that the analysis
of their concepts allows it. Bolzano holds that purely conceptual sciences
are proper sciences, namely, roughly, sciences which contain only purely
conceptual truths and can be built according to his construal of the (17)
model above (WL§525, IV 261), which also means that grounding in the
sense of (*) is applicable to them. Purely conceptual truths contain as parts
only concepts, and do not contain any intuitions, which are certain simple
and single ideas. Since concepts can very well have existing, real objects in
their extension there are purely conceptual sciences whose objects are exist-
ing ones (theology, parts of ethics, the pure part of physics); those sciences
can in principle be proper ones as well, with a grounding structure not differ-
ing from that of mathematics (see Bolzano after 1830/1966: 208; Mancosu
1999: 437). But, as said, this possibility depends on that of dening all
concepts appearing in the propositions of those sciences.
Causality and heterogeneity of application of grounding in different sci-
ences (Sebestik 1992: 261) do not seem to pose problems to the concept of
grounding then, but to the status of certain sciences as proper sciences. They
pose such problems because of Bolzano’s adherence to the scientic model
expressed in sentences (17) and because of the humongous grounding chain
Bolzano wants.
In a nutshell, my hypothesis is that Bolzano was uncertain about (*) be-
cause he could not reduce material grounding to formal grounding, and that,
in turn, he could not reduce material grounding to formal grounding because
of the following: (1) he did not distinguish internal and external grounding,
(2) he lacked, with respect to external grounding, a rigorous way to dispose
a number of sciences in relations of subordination or presupposition, and,
largely as a consequence of this, (3) he did not know how to show rigorously
which (if any) empirical sciences are proper sciences. All three problems
are variously connected with requirements on the (degrees of) simplicity and
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generality of the truths involved in grounding chains. So, Bolzano’s prob-
lem with (*) was not the failure to capture our ordinary ‘because’, but the
arrangement of various (conceptual and empirical) sciences into levels while
keeping a unique systematic ordering of their truths as grounds and conse-
quences reducible to formal relations.
Now that we know more about grounding, its aims and difculties, we can
address the question of the use that is made, at present, of Bolzano’s views.
Recently, Bolzano’s ideas on grounding have been taken up by Benjamin
Schnieder. I wish to consider in particular Schnieder 2006b, a paper in which
Schnieder puts forward a criticism of metaphysical grounding, i.e. truthmak-
ing, which in fact draws heavily on Bolzano’s theorizations on conceptual
explanation. I am going to look into whether the specic use that Schnieder
makes in that paper of the latter, on the basis of what we now know about it,
is effective against truthmaking. I argue it is not. Yet, I say, the opponents
cannot easily save truthmaking.
5. Bolzano’s grounding in present-day metaphysics
My question from the Introduction was: why are answers in terms of truth-
making bad answers to explanatory questions? Consider again
(Causal) Socrates is pale because he’s scared to death
(Metaphysical) *‘Socrates is pale’ is true because there exists a trope of
paleness in Socrates
(Conceptual) Socrates is pale because he’s a white guy of skin type I.
Schnieder 2006b defends a view according to which causal and conceptual
explanations are good, but metaphysical explanations are bad.33 So, why
does he think that?34 In this section I shall put forward some critical remarks
33 Conceptual/Causal explanations such as ‘Xanthippe became a widow because Socrates
drank hemlock’ are also good. That conceptual and causal explanations are good: Schnieder
2006b: 31ff.; that metaphysical ones are bad: Schnieder 2006b: 39ff. Here I concentrate
on Schnieder’s criticism of truthmaking as explanatory of predication and I shall disregard
complaints focusing on the linguistic oddity of truthmaking jargon to laymen’s ears (“That
Jean’s singing makes it true that she is singing, that the apple’s redness makes it true that the
apple is red [...] are linguistic oddities by any ordinary standards.”, Schnieder 2006b: 22).
34 Note that there is an important difference between two forms of metaphysical grounding
which I am ignoring. Propositional metaphysical grounding is a relation between proposi-
tions as expressed in e.g.
(i) ‘Socrates is pale’ is true because there exists a trope of paleness in Socrates
03betti
2010/9/27
page 303
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
EXPLANATION – BOLZANO’S THEORY OF GROUND AND CONSEQUENCE 303
about the last part of Schnieder 2006b and relate this discussion to what
I say in the previous sections. Before I do that, I shall say that I do not
intend to defend any systematic point of view about explanation here, and
that my criticism of Schnieder is mainly of methodological nature. In fact, I
do share Schnieder’s criticism of truthmaking  that means I will be mainly
playing the devil’s advocate here. What I think is that Schnieder’s criticism
is not effective, but that truthmaker theorists will have hard time rebutting it
anyway.
Why are conceptual and causal explanations good and metaphysical ex-
planations bad? At the very minimum, this depends on what should count as
an explanation. Let us just agree that an explanatory relation is asymmetric
and irreexive, for the moment disregarding (in)transitivity. What else? We
need to put some more substance on that relation if what we want to talk
about is explanation, and not, say, proper parthood  and if we want to ex-
clude metaphysical explanation, i.e. truthmaking, as Schnieder does. For if
we don’t, the question will still remain: what is it that detractors object to
truthmaking as purportedly providing explanations? What is it about expla-
nation that licenses conceptual and causal explanations, but not metaphysical
explanation? One thing in particular we need to know: how should we con-
strue asymmetry? What determines the direction of explanation? What is it,
in whatever determines the direction of explanation, that licenses conceptual
and causal explanations, but not metaphysical explanation?
In his previous 2006a, Schnieder (rightly) criticized attempts to explicate
the notion of truthmaking as a combination of projection and necessita-
tion. Schnieder 2006b explores another option open to truthmaker theorists,
namely that of explicating the concept of truthmaking in terms of the con-
nective because:
(TM) x is a truth-maker of p↔df p is true, because x exists.
(ii) Socrates is pale because there exists a trope of paleness in Socrates
Non-propositional metaphysical grounding is instead a relation between e.g. a trope (a non-
semantic entity) and a truthbearer (a semantic entity) which is true in virtue of the trope; that
relation is expressed in phrases like ‘Socrates’ paleness makes it true that Socrates is pale’.
One can also call the latter ‘ontic’, as Künne does, the former (that is, i. and ii.) ‘ontological’
grounding or explanation. Here I focus on Schnieder 2006b’s criticism of the propositional
sort (ontological), as a possible explication of non-propositional (ontic) grounding. Note that
a philosopher eschewing ontic grounding is not thereby eschewing every form of correspon-
dence or claiming that there is nothing in the world truths are about. Indeed, Bolzano is an
example in case (see Betti under review; Künne 2003: 108–10).
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This xed, Schnieder moves on to criticize truthmaker theorists by arguing
that truthmaking so explicated does not deliver the truthmakers they want.
Among others via application of an instance of (a generalization of) ‘Aristo-
tle’s insight’, namely
(T) If ‘Socrates is pale’ is true at all, then ‘Socrates is pale’ is true because
Socrates is pale,
Schnieder gets from
(Metaphysical) *‘Socrates is pale’ is true because there exists a trope of
paleness in Socrates
to
(S1′) Socrates is pale because there exists a trope of paleness in Socrates.
(Note that this step is by no means innocent, but let this pass). Then he con-
siders the two sentences
(S1) *Socrates is pale because Socrates’ paleness exists
(S2) Socrates’ paleness exists because Socrates is pale.35
And now Schnieder says that (S2) is an explanation whereas (S1) is not
(they cannot be both explanations, given asymmetry). So, ‘TM-theorists
have drawn a blank’ (Schnieder 2006b: 41).
Now we can ask: Why? Why is (S2) an explanation and (S1) not? On what
does this claim rest? To keep (S2) and rule out (S1) we need to justify why
we take the correct direction of explanation to be that of (S2). But Schnieder
2006b does not seem to give a straightforward answer to this question. Or
does he? Let’s see.
Foot-stamping ‘because’  Schnieder takes ‘because’ to express a primi-
tive relation between propositions (Schnieder 2006b: 31) since he thinks its
conceptual content does not allow for a reductive analysis. However, this is
not very convenient. The reason for this not being very convenient is that
Schnieder thinks that there are in fact two kinds of explanations, concep-
tual and causal, whereas, as we saw, he does not think that metaphysical
explanations are explanations at all. Philosophers accepting metaphysical
explanations, however, might just say that these constitute a third, perfectly
acceptable ‘because’: the ‘because’ of metaphysical explanation. On which
basis can we refute them? Perhaps there’s some good reason to do so, but I
do not think we can reason as follows: we take because to express a prim-
itive explanatory relation, then we say that there are actually two different
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kinds of explanatory relations, conceptual and causal, but not a third, meta-
physical kind. Can ‘because’ really be primitive in such a situation? Aren’t
we foot stamping? If there is a lesson metaphysicians can still learn from
the (granted, rather decrepit sounding) Classical Ideal of Science (see Sec-
tion 2 above) it is that the primitives should be chosen with an eye to their
intelligibility (although intelligibility is not an explicit requirement in the
framework, it somewhat follows from requirement 7). Now, I am not at-
out saying that ‘because’ in itself is not intelligible. I am saying that the
specific ‘because’ that Schnieder takes as primitive is not by itself as such
intelligible because that notion is supposed to full too many specic the-
oretical desiderata: it must a) be conceptual, b) not be causal, c) yet leave
space for another notion of ‘because’ which is causal, d) rule out the meta-
physical ‘because’ (it should also, by the way, not be the ‘evidential use of
because’; the latter use however seems to be excluded by Schnieder, though
not in the same way and with the same purpose as the metaphysical ‘be-
cause’; never mind this further complication). It could perhaps be objected
that Schnieder does not take the supposedly primitive notion expressed by
‘because’ to be that of conceptual explanation only, but to be a broader no-
tion subsuming both conceptual and causal explanation (at any case, he does
not take the causal notion to be reducible to the conceptual notion). But this
does not seem to make the situation any better, because now that ‘because’
expresses a causal or conceptual  but, handily, not metaphysical  ex-
planation, so we pass from a foot-stamping ‘because’ to a question-begging
one. (Note that I don’t think that the metaphysical ‘because’ is any better in
this respect).
But perhaps this conceptual because is not, after all, really primitive? In any
case, in order to have some claims come out as good explanations and other
claims as bad explanations, one ought to say more on the direction of ex-
planation, that is, one ought to give criteria for the asymmetry of ‘because’.
And indeed, as we shall see, something like a criterion can be distilled from
what Schnieder says.
Criteria for the asymmetry of ‘because’: simplicity of concepts  Let us
consider again
(S1) *Socrates is pale because Socrates’ paleness exists
(S2) Socrates’ paleness exists because Socrates is pale.
There is a reason, after all, that Schnieder gives for why he thinks that (S2) is
an explanation and (S1) is not. Namely, ‘Socrates’ paleness’ is conceptually
more complex than ‘Socrates is pale’. Here is his general statement:
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(BS1) [...] The direction of conceptual explanations seems to be
owed to factors of conceptual complexity and primitiveness; in gen-
eral, statements involving complex or elaborated concepts are ex-
plained in recourse to more primitive concepts. (Schnieder 2006b:
33)
We see that in order to rule out S1 as an explanation, Schnieder says some-
thing that, generally speaking, comes very near to the simplicity constraint
in Bolzano’s tentative denition of grounding. This seems a good occasion
for stressing the remarkable debts that Schnieder 2006b’s conceptual expla-
nation has to Bolzano’s grounding. The basics of Schnieder’s conceptual
explanation are exactly the same as Bolzano’s grounding: rst, conceptual
explanation (grounding) is a relation holding among two truths, a relation
different from derivability (at any case far stronger), and which can be ex-
pressed linguistically by ‘because’; secondly, it is an irreexive and asym-
metric relation; thirdly, it is a relation taken as primitive, though the direction
of explanation is accounted for by means of (degrees of) conceptual simplic-
ity (and, as I suggested, Bolzano has doubts on its primitivity); fourthly, (T),
i.e. ‘Socrates is pale’ is true because Socrates is pale, is Bolzano’s reading
of a famous passage by Aristotle.36 Fifthly, BS1 suggests that Schnieder
takes up a compositional theory of concepts (meanings), similar enough to
Bolzano’s theory of concepts; indeed:
Canonical designators of particularised properties, such as ‘Socrates’
paleness’, are semantically complex expressions, whose meaning is
a function of the meaning of their parts and their way of combining.
(Schnieder 2006b: 40)
This is also conrmed by what Schnieder says on (T):
The explanatory force of (T) is comparable to that in the examples
of conceptual explanations discussed so far; it is an explanation of a
proposition employing a logically elaborate concept, the concept ex-
pressed by ‘true’, by a conceptually simpler proposition. This latter
proposition does not employ concepts which enter into an analysis
of the concepts expressed by ‘true’ (Schnieder 2006b: 36).
So, Schnieder supposes, like Bolzano, that
36 Cf. WL§198, §205; Ibid.: 11; Künne 2003: 150–1; Schnieder 2006: 35.
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(S2) Socrates’ paleness exists because Socrates is pale
is explanatory because it gets the direction of explanation right, which, in
turn, means that it gets the order of concepts right: the more complex con-
cepts in the explanandum and the simpler concepts in the explanans. In our
case, this must mean that the concepts involved in ‘Socrates’ paleness exists’
are more complex that the concepts involved in ‘Socrates is pale’.
To this there is an extremely close Bolzanian parallel. For Bolzano ‘A is
b’ (more precisely ‘A has b’) is the basic form of all propositions. Bolzano’s
translation of (S2) would be
(S2′) The quality of having by Socrates of (his) paleness has existence be-
cause Socrates has paleness
In the explanandum, the (pure and mixed) concepts of having, has, existence,
Socrates and paleness appear; in the explanans, only Socrates, has, and pale-
ness appear. Therefore, this is the correct direction of explanation, not that
of (S1), although the two truths connected by because do not differ in their
ontological counterparts and they are interderivable. A similar case is given
in Wissenschaftslehre §225:
The relation of A to b is the relation of certain objects to a quality
belonging to them. A conclusion that [...] might be seen as an ob-
jective consequence of [A has b, A.B.] (§225, 6. 399).
This means that
(i) Socrates is pale
is equivalent to, and is the objective ground of
(ii) the relation of Socrates to paleness is the relation of certain objects to
a quality belonging to them.
Which means that (i) is conceptually prior to (ii) and (i) and (ii) are mutually
derivable. Moreover, (i) is also equivalent to and the objective ground of our
(iii) Socrates’ paleness exists.
There are three elements of Schnieder’s position which Bolzano does not
endorse. I am going to argue that Bolzano is better off, though. We have
seen two of them already: the rst is that Bolzanian grounding is intransi-
tive, Schnieder’s transitive; the second is that Bolzano has a unique kind of
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explanation, conceptual explanation, instead of two kinds, conceptual and
causal like Schnieder. I will come back to these two elements in a minute.
Let’s see the third element of difference rst. Bolzano would be opposed to
the following claim:
BSClaim: conceptual complexity can be read off directly from linguistic
complexity in natural language.
My evidence for BSClaim are passages such as these:
(BS2) Canonical designators of particularised properties, such as
‘Socrates’ paleness’, are semantically complex expressions, whose
meaning is a function of the meaning of their parts and their way
of combining [A]. Mastery of the rules that govern the formation of
such expressions will give rise to an understanding of any combina-
tion of a property term, such as ‘paleness’, with an arbitrary singular
term, such as ‘Socrates’, as long as the terms combined are under-
stood [B]. But this is just to say that such a canonical designator
of a trope [‘Socrates’ paleness’, ab] expresses a logically complex
concept, the grasp of which requires us to relate it to the concepts
expressed by the phrase’s components, which will be conceptually
more primitive [C, my emphasis]. Thus we understand ‘Socrates’
paleness’ along the following line: it denotes a particular instance
of paleness, existing as a feature of Socrates just in case that he is
pale. Generally, we understand an expression of the form x’s F-
ness to denote a particular instance of F-ness, existing as a feature
of x just in case that x is F. [D] (Schnieder 2006b: 40)
I am not sure how many would subscribe to BSClaim without seeing the de-
tails; nor do I know how the details, that is, a theory for the transformations
based on degrees of linguistic complexity in [B] would look like. Besides,
in [B] and [D] (BS2) suggests a claim which is even stronger than BSClaim,
namely that conceptual complexity is a function of our (psychological or
epistemic) mastery of linguistic complexity in natural language:
[T]ruth is not analysable in terms of the concepts expressed by
‘white’ and ‘snow’, because someone can have a grasp of the con-
cept of truth without knowing anything about snow or colour white
(Schnieder 2006b: 36, my emphasis).
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It seems in fact that this is the reason why Schnieder assumes that concep-
tual complexity can be read off directly from linguistic complexity in nat-
ural language. The view that what comes rst in cognition, subjectively,
matches objective lexico-linguistic and conceptual primacy would be re-
jected by Bolzano even more rmly than BSClaim. As said, Schnieder sup-
poses, like Bolzano, that
(S2) Socrates’ paleness exists because Socrates is pale
is explanatory because it gets the direction of explanation right, which, in
turn, means that the concepts involved in ‘Socrates’ paleness exists’ are
more complex that the concepts involved in ‘Socrates is pale’. But unlike
Bolzano, Schnieder seems to think that the reason why ‘Socrates’ paleness’
is more complex is that understanding ‘Socrates’ paleness exists’ requires
understanding ‘Socrates is pale’ rst. Again, without knowing the details,
we cannot judge whether this position is ultimately better than Bolzano’s.
There is however one observation that can be made against Schnieder’s view
of explanation. If my analysis of that view is correct, then the following ex-
ample is problematic:
(S4) This is water because it is H20.
This is ‘the because of theoretical reduction’ (Künne 2003: 154) (there are
many other possible examples, such as ‘This is Tuscan kale because it is
Brassica oleracea acephala palmifolia’). Now compare
(S5) This is H20 because it is water (‘This is Brassica oleracea acephala
palmifolia because it is Tuscan kale’)
One can very well contend that (S4) is correct and (S5) is not. One can
also claim that (S4) is a variety of explanation which is a good parallel to
(S1), and that this shows that Schnieder’s position is unconvincing and un-
appealing since it means rejecting something that looks like a perfectly good
and useful notion of scientific explanation  possibly the most interesting
we have to look at. Let us rst of all suppose that (S4) is a conceptual ex-
planation: it is based on the truth ‘the concept of water is the concept of a
substance whose chemical composition is H20’. Now Schnieder claims that
the conceptually simpler (in the sense in which he seems to take this) ex-
plains the conceptually more complex, so we have
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Simpler
is
explained
by
more
complex
More
complex
is
explained
by
simpler
(S1)
Socrates
is pale
because
(S2)
Socrates’
paleness
exists
(S2)
Socrates’
paleness
exists
because
(S1)
Socrates
is pale
3 7
But, if so, in the case of (S4) and (S5) we would have
(S4) This is
water because it is H20
(S5) This is
H20
because it is water.
3?? 7??
The problem is that the concept of H20 seems a far more complex concept
than that of water. We can bet that we can’t really grasp the concept of H20 if
we do not already have a grasp of that of water. But on Schnieder’s account,
this would mean that, of the two, ‘This is H20 because it is water’ is an ex-
planation, whereas ‘This is water because it is H20’ is not. This would mean
that theoretical reductions are no explanations. And yet it seems that one
can hardly say that giving the exact chemical composition of water does not
explain what water is, while saying that something is water would instead
explain H20, or what H20 is. Now, I say that one could argue similarly in
defense of truthmaking, on the basis that the expression ‘a trope of paleness
in Socrates’ is technical jargon in metaphysics just as expressions like ‘H20’
are technical jargon in chemistry:
(S1′) Socrates is pale because there exists a trope of paleness in Socrates.
(S4) This is water because it is H20.
Metaphysical explanations, one could argue, are metaphysical reductions.
And I say that Schnieder’s position does not have a means to exclude the
metaphysical explanations ad (S1′) without abandoning the theoretical re-
ductions ad (S4). Note that the chemical composition of water was xed
by Berzelius in 1826, when Bolzano was writing the Wissenschaftslehre; as-
suming that he knew this, he would say, arguably, that ‘water’ and ‘H20’
differ only linguistically, but they express the same concept. So, neither S4
nor S5 are explanations for Bolzano. His position is not in trouble. It would
be good to get clear on the relationship between metaphysical explanations,
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explanations in science, and the kind of ‘common sense’ explanations re-
vealed by the kind of ordinary language analysis applied by Schnieder. If
not, it seems there are only question-begging moves available.
Indeed, Schnieder 2006b’s position on metaphysical explanation looks
possible only on a level of analysis of a certain, likely question-begging kind,
that is, when ‘because’ is the because of conceptual explanation and x’s F-
ness is defined as denoting a particular instance of F-ness, existing as a
feature of x just in case that x is F. Sure the following holds only when we
refuse from the start to acknowledge any kind of explanatory relation other
than conceptual or causal:
[(S1)] presupposes an explanatory relation, where there is none. No
causal and no conceptual explanation is given with it; the conceptual
explanation which one might deem it to give would invoke logically
complex concepts for an explanation of their more primitive com-
ponents. But this is to turn things upside down; accordingly I con-
clude that statement [S1, A.B.] is nothing but a pseudo-explanation.
Socrates’ paleness does not do much; in particular, it does not make
it true that Socrates is pale. (Schnieder 2006b: 41)
Now, this connects to the second element of difference between Schnieder
and Bolzano. One might say that one is stuck with some question-begging
things somewhere anyway. Bolzano isn’t stuck here however. As we have
seen, in Schnieder 2006b, causal explanations are of a different kind than
conceptual ones while this honour is precluded to metaphysical explanations
with no good ground. But again, this problem does not arise for Bolzano’s
position: since he reduces causal to conceptual explanation, the direction of
explanation of the former is brought back to degrees of conceptual complex-
ity (in his sense). This is also why Bolzano has nothing like metaphysical
grounding: for him, explanation only made sense as construed as a relation
among propositions and their parts, a relation at bottom extensional in the
mereological sense (these are the only explanations by things you nd in
Bolzano). But if we do not want to take up this unied picture (and I am
not saying we should), then the kind of direction of explanation depends on
the reading of ‘because’: degree of complexity in the conceptual case, per-
haps time or whatever else in the causal case (Schnieder 2006b: 33). But,
as I already mentioned, if so, how do we rule out, without ad hoc moves, a
third kind of explanation, metaphysical explanation? This weakens the case
against S1 in a fundamental way.
The above also suggests a rst, possible way-out for truthmaker theorists.
At a metaphysical level, the counterpart of both sides of S1 and S2 is the
same object: a simple trope (or a fact, or whatever, see Mulligan 1984 et
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al, Simon and Smith 2007, Smith 1999). One could simply say that exactly
like in causal connection the direction of asymmetry is given by something
else than conceptual complexity, in metaphysical explanations the direction
is also given by something else. The something else could be, surprise sur-
prise, a metaphysical theory of what things are. One would argue that what
determines the direction of explanation is, obviously, the primacy of worlds
over words (and concepts). However, this is by no means an easy way to
go, for going this way means getting clear on what theoretical reductions in
metaphysics are. They do not seem to be cases of internal grounding. But are
they cases of external grounding? If they are, one could go back to believing
that metaphysics is the foundation of all special sciences, where the idea of
foundation is captured by external grounding and metaphysics is accepted
as a scientific enterprise. One would have all reasons to be sceptical of this,
but I’m afraid that, should Schnieder’s objections to the modal construal of
truthmaking prevail, and his challenge hold, truthmaker theorists do not have
that many alternatives.
The option of treating metaphysics as scientic enterprise connects to the
rst element of difference between Schnieder and Bolzano: transitivity. As
should be clear from the previous sections, Bolzano’s convinctions on ground-
ing rested on his views of what a proper science looked like. I have argued
that seeing grounding in this context makes it possible for us to see that the
notion of grounding Bolzano was really after was that of formal grounding,
i.e. derivability of a specic sort between the truths forming an axiomatic
science, and such that grounds are axioms and consequences theorems. And
this, I argued, explains why he wanted grounding to be intransitive: the ax-
ioms of a science explain its theorems, full stop  there is nothing theorems
have to explain. This is also why Bolzano’s doubts about the primitivity of
material grounding are genuine. If my interpretation is correct, he could not
dene grounding in terms of derivability due to limitations of fundamentally
technical kind. What real reason do we have to keep a primitive notion of
grounding which Bolzano would have gladly abandoned, if he had had our
formal sophistication and knowledge of axiomatic structures? Perhaps part
of the reason to insist on the primitiveness comes from Schnieder’s concern
with capturing the ‘ordinary concept’ expressed by ‘because’ (like Tatzel ar-
gues that Bolzano was doing). But why this concern at all? Which aims,
and which methodology grounds it, and what’s the gain? If I am right in my
account of Bolzano’s aims, then this is not perhaps the most promising way
to be inspired by Bolzano. Why keep on insisting on the primitivity of ‘be-
cause’ if there are reasons to think that that notion can be explained as fruit-
fulness of axiom systems? Suppose we can’t dismiss those reasons. There
are, then, more successful versions of what Bolzano wanted that we can ex-
ploit. Not surprisingly, the only worked out, rigorous, and consistent formal
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attempts I know to accomplish what Bolzano wanted, due to Le·sniewski
and his pupil Adolf Lindenbaum, are formal, axiomatic deductive theories
(one of which, Ontology, is based on ‘A is b’-sentences), and a formal ac-
count of the simplicity of notions geared to axiomatic systems (see Linden-
baum 1936). This is not what BS2 seems to want, though. The axioms of
Le·sniewskian systems are, by that account, simple; but they are extremely
demanding to understand (indeed, the axiom of Protothetics is very much
not obvious).37 Personally, I have no difculties with taking metaphysics to
be Le·sniewski’s axiomatic, classical, fully extensional Mereology. But I am
afraid this isn’t a popular position, to put it mildly.
There is a second way in which truthmaker theorists could rebut to Schnieder.
Following Bolzano, Schnieder supposes that the linguistic/conceptual com-
plexity of ‘Socrates’ paleness exists’ makes it more complex than the pred-
ication ‘Socrates is pale’. But why should the direction of explanation be
based on the degree of complexity of the concepts involved in ‘Socrates’
paleness’ rather than, say, on the priority of existential forms of assertion
over categorical predications? If we don’t give any argument, truthmaker
theorists could easily invoke a second criterion for conceptual explanation,
one that would block Schnieder 2006b’s Bolzano-avoured arguments. For
if the criterion to set the direction of explanation would be given by the
priority of existential forms of assertion over categorical predications, what
truthmaker theorists want to accomplish would be accomplished. If I were a
truthmaking adept (cum trope theorist), and wanted to play by the same rules
as Schnieder’s, I would insist on an alternative construal of the direction of
explanation given by the fundamentality of existential forms of predication,
something along the lines of a Brentanian analysis of judgement. ‘Socrates’
paleness exists/Socrates’ paleness does not exist’, I would argue, are not
predications, but just linguistic devices to express the absolutely basic form
of a (positive or negative) assertion. For consider
Judgments in this group [‘John exists’, A.B.] are true if and only
if the entity to which existence is attributed [...] does in fact exist.
The existence of that entity yields an ontological explanation of the
corresponding truth. (Simon and Smith 2007, my emphasis).
Now, what if one insisted that the basic form of assertion is ‘A’s b exists’,
while ‘A is b’ just derivative, on the basis of the fact that the former, not the
latter, expresses at best both the structure of our judgements and how things
are in the world? This would just amount to a change of hero: exit Bolzano,
37 On this theme (but not in connection to Les´niewski), see Shapiro 2009.
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enter Brentano, Twardowski & co. What would rule this out? Schnieder’s
methodology would not be able to. However, a move like this comes at
a high price, for it would mean for truthmaker theorists to exchange their
fundamental notion of metaphysical explanation for both conceptual expla-
nation and an analysis of assertion which is quite atypical, in no way part of
common lore. Again, I am not sure how many truthmaker theorists would be
prepared to do this.
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